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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-OIL POLLUTION CONTROL-IN THE
ABSENCE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND ANY FATAL CONFLICT
BETWEEN STATUTORY SCHEMES, A STATE MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY
EXERCISE ITS POLICE POWER To PROVIDE FOR CLEANUP OF OIL
SPILLAGE AND FOR RECOUPEMENT OF COSTS CONCURRENTLY WITH
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
Plaintiffs-Appellees I brought an action against the State of Florida2 to enjoin
application of the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act'
(hereinafter referred to as the Florida Act). Appellees challenged the Florida
Act on the grounds that the provisions for unlimited liability' conflicted with
the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 19705 (hereinafter referred to
as the Federal Act) and the Limitation of Liability Act.6 Appellees also con-
tended that the state's police power over sea-to-shore pollution was preempted
by the Admiralty Extension Act.7 Defendant-Appellant maintained that the
Federal Act itself encouraged state regulation and cooperation.a A three-judge
District Court9 for the Middle District of Florida held the Florida Act was an
unconstitutional intrusion into federal maritime jurisdiction, declared the Act
null and void, and enjoined its enforcement.10 Held, judgment reversed. The
'Plaintiffs-Appellees included merchant shippers, world shipping associations, members of the
Florida costal barge and towing industry, and owners and operators of oil terminal facilities and
heavy industries located in Florida.
'In the original action officials responsible for enforcing the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and
Pollution Control Act, GEN. FLA. LAWS ch. 70,244 (1970), were named as defendants, but the State
of Florida, asserted that her interests were much broader than those of the named defendants.
Rubin O'D. Askew, governor of Florida, was thus named as defendant.
3GEN. FLA. LAws ch. 70-244 (1970).
'/d. § 12 provides that anyone who "permits or suffers" a discharge shall be liable to the State
for all clean-up costs and for damages resulting from injury to others; the State does not need to
plead or prove negligence, only the fact of the discharge.
533 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. (1971).
-46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1971).
746 U.S.C. § 740 (1971):
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include
all cases of damage or injury, to person or property caused by a vessel on navigable water
notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.
133 U.S.C. § 1161 (o) (1971) provides:
(I) Nothing in this section shall affect or modify in any way the obligations of any
owner or operator of any vessel, or of any owner or operator of any onshore facility or
offshore facility to any person or agency under any provision of law for damages to any
publicly-owned or privately-owned property resulting from a discharge of any oil or
from the removal of any such oil.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any State or political
subdivision thereof from imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the dis-
charge of oil into any waters within such State.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed . . . to affect any State or local law not
in conflict with this section.
'28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (Three-judge court required to enjoin enforcement of a state statute).
"American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
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Florida Act does not invade a regulatory area preempted by the Federal Act,
nor is the state's police power over sea-to-shore pollution preempted by the
Admiralty Extension Act, as it does not purport to provide an exclusive remedy
in this admiralty-related situation. Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc., 93 S. Ct. 1590 (1973).
The relationship between state and federal regulation in the admiralty area
has been a source of confusion in the development of maritime law. Article III
of the Constitution" and Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 178912 have together
vested the federal judiciary with significant power in the maritime field. Addi-
tionally, Congress has the power to enact legislation in Admiralty under the
necessary and proper clause 3 of the Constitution. Underlying these maritime
law provisions is the concept that certain areas of the law require uniformity"
throughout the United States in order to be effective. Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 5 decided in 1917, bolstered the uniformity concept 6 by proposing that
the general features of maritime law could not be changed by the states so as
to defeat uniformity. 7 Jensen was followed by two cases" which in support of
uniformity even prohibited Congress from delegating any maritime power to
"U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 extends the judicial power of the United States "to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354
(1959); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
"
2 The present version of § 9 is 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1971), which gives the district courts original
jurisdiction, exclusive of any state court, of "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
3U.S. CO ST. art. 1, § 8.
"The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874) where Justice Bradley stated:
. . . [T]he Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and
operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention
to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the
several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the
Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse
of the States with each other or with foreign states.
See also Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) in which the Court stated that
not only did the Constitution empower the federal government in admiralty, it also took from the
States all power to legislate laws which might interfere with that "proper harmony and uniform-
ity."
' 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (New York Workman's Compensation law not validly applied to compen-
sate longshoreman's widow for his death, which occurred on a vessel in navigable waters.)
'
6ld. at 217:
If New York can subject foreign ships coming into her ports to such obligations as those
imposed by her compensation statute, other states may do likewise. The result would
be the destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the
Constitution was designed to establish; and freedom of navigation between the States
and with foreign countries would be seriously hampered and impeded.
"
7The Court did not deny completely that there could be state action in the maritime area, but
it tried to set up a definitive test which would allow the state regulation to stand.
"Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. W.C. Dawson and Co.,
264 U.S. 219 (1924) (Both cases rejected Congressional efforts to apply state workmen's compensa-
tion statutes to shipboard injuries suffered by longshoremen).
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the states. 9 Under the "Jensen rule" set forth in these cases, the Court will
declare invalid any state legislation " which contravenes the purpose of a federal
maritime act or materially prejudices "the characteristic features of the general
maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law
in its international and interstate relations."'" However, the dividing line be-
tween the legislation a state can and cannot pass is unclear.2 Many of the
objections to the Jensen line of reasoning center around the contention that
maritime law cannot be shown to be an independent body of law,23 and,
therefore, it is necessary to supplement it with the common law and the statu-
tory law of the states.2 '
"Washington v. W.C. Dawson and Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227 (1924):
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime law by
statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This power . . may
not be delegated to the several states. The grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
looks to uniformity . . . . The subject is national. Local interests must yield to the
common welfare. The Constitution is supreme.
nThe opinion in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) went so far as to say
that the clause of the provision granting otherwise exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
to the Federal Courts (Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9), which saves to suitors "in all cases the right of
a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it," refers to remedies for
enforcement of the federal maritime law, and does not create substantive rights or assent to their
creation by the states. But see Justice Holmes' strong dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 221-22 (1917).
"Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). Congress later passed the Longshore-
man's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1927), which provided
compensation to any worker accidentally injured while loading, unloading, or repairing any vessel
larger than eighteen tons net weight, but only if the accident occurred on the navigable waters of
the United States and recovery could not be validly provided for by state law.
See also Victory Carriers Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971) which indicates that in spite of this
attempt of Congress to provide a line of demarcation between maritime and state law, the relative
roles of state and federal law nevertheless remained somewhat confused on the seaward side. The
Court placed the responsibility for the confusion on the case law modification of Jensen which had
preserved certain state remedies for accidents and deaths occuring on navigable waters.
zDavis v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 317 U.S. 249, 252 (1942), where Justice Black wrote,
in regard to the Jensen demarcation line, that "[w]hen a state could, and when it could not grant
protection under a compensation act was left as a perplexing problem, for it was held 'difficult if
not impossible' to define this boundary with exactness." The Court's opinion in Jensen, 244 U.S.
at 216, also admitted that it was,
difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the general maritime
law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation. That this may be done
to some extent cannot be denied. . . . Equally well established is the rule that state
statutes may not contravene an applicable act of Congress or affect the general maritime
law beyond certain limits.
"Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 374 (1959), which states that, "..
maritime law is not a monistic system. The State and Federal Governments jointly exert regulatory
powers today as they have played joint roles in the developement of maritime law throughout our
history."
"Id. at 373, where Justice Frankfurter writes that, ". . . to claim that all enforced rights
pertaining to matters maritime are rooted in federal law is a destructive oversimplification of the
highly intricate interplay of the States and National Government in their regulation of maritime
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The demand for uniformity is often opposed by two correlative justifications
for parallel state and federal regulation which are based on the so-called "gap
theory" and the concept of a state's prerogatives under its police power. Under
the "gap theory" a state may act in an area where the federal government has
been completely silent 5 or where it has circumscribed its regulation to occupy
only a portion of the area.16 Although a state, even in the exercise of its police
powers, may not "contravene" a federal law, 7 the federal regulation must
clearly manifest its purpose to supersede state legislation.28 The Supreme Court
has also shown a tendency to consider the nature of the regulation under
examination in light of whether the regulation attempts to control a local or a
national subject.2 9 A national regulation of a ship's equipment might be aimed
at insuring that the ship is seaworthy; a state's regulation of that same equip-
ment might be an attempt to protect the health and enhance the cleanliness of
the local community. 0 The validity of this type of concurrent regulation is
commerce . See also Justice Holmes' dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
218 (1917).
"STransportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1882), where the Court held that since no
act of Congress had been passed for the regulation of wharfage and there was nothing in the
Constitution to prevent the states from regulating it, then so long as Congress saw fit to abstain
from action, that subject was within the domain of state law. Accord, Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg,
105 U.S. 559 (1881).
" Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court allowed state regulations for the inspection
of the hull and machinery of motor driven tugs on the theory that the federal statute of inspection
was in a limited field, and, therefore state regulation was not forbidden. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313
U.S. 69 (1941), where the court held that a federal regulation limiting the size of sponges which
could be gathered did not preclude a state statute dealing with diving apparatus for that gathering.
27Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
28Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. I, 10 (1937):
The principle is throughly established that the exercise by the State of its police power,
which would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the
repugnance or conflict is so "direct and positive" that the two acts cannot "be reconciled
or consistently stand together."
Accord, Mints v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118 (1919).
"Colley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Accord, Transportation Co. v.
Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1882).
"Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). The Court held that the
fact that vessels used in interstate commerce, and their equipment, including boilers, had been
inspected, approved, and licensed by the federal government to operate in interstate commerce in
accordance with a comprehensive system of regulations enacted by Congress, did not prohibit the
city from enforcing its smoke abatement ordinance with respect to such vessels. However, see
Justice Douglas' dissent which states that the requirements of the Detroit smoke ordinance are
squarely in conflict with the federal statute because the equipment approved and licensed by the
federal government for use on navigable waters cannot "pass muster" under local laws. Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U.S. I (1937), where the Court said that a vessel which was unsafe and unseawor-
thy was not within the protection of the uniformity principle and the state might treat it as it would
treat a diseased animal or unwholesome food. However, if the state went further and attempted to
impose particular standards as to structure, design, operation, etc., then the state regulation could
be judged invalid as a trespass on the federal area. See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 (1917).
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recognized in many areas of interstate commerce and maritime activities, state
created liens,3 recognition of state wrongful death actions," and state laws
governing the specific performance of arbitration agreements.3 The interstate
commerce of the railroad industry, an area also thought of as requiring uni-
formity, tolerated a state statute imposing strict liability for damages to prop-
erty or persons with no abatement of the effectiveness of federal law.34 In
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit," the Court allowed a local ordinance regulating
smoke emission from furnaces and boilers to stand, even though the Court
acknowledged that ". . . Congress has maintained an extensive and compre-
hensive set of controls over ships and shipping. 136 The Court said that his
legislation was designed to insure the seagoing safety of vessels, while the
Detroit ordinance was aimed strictly at the elimination of air pollution. 37
In Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., s3 the Court faced a
problem similar to that in Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit.39 Two issues had to
be resolved: Was the Florida Act preempted by the Federal Act; and could the
state still exercise its police power respecting maritime activities concurrently
with the federal government?
The unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, seemed to have
little problem with either issue. Comparing the two acts the Court found no
fatal contravention of the Federal Act by the Florida Act. The Federal Act
3 Vancouver S.S. Co. v. Rice, 288 U.S. 445 (1933) (Held, Admiralty Courts have jurisdiction
to enforce liens against boat or vessel in accordance with state law subjecting vessel to lien for
damages); The Planter, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324 (1833) (Jurisdiction of admiralty, in cases where
repairs are needed upon a domestic vessel, depends upon local law of the state. If the local law
gives a lien, then said law may be enforced in admiralty).
"Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941) (Although there is no maritime right of action for
wrongful death, when a state, acting within its province has created liability for wrongful death,
the admiralty court will enforce it); Western Fuel Co. v. Carcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921) (Admiralty
court can give damages for death on water in a state which allows such damages).
"Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924) (New York arbitration law held
applicable to agreements for arbitration of disputes arising under maritime contracts, where such
contracts are made in New York and are to be performed there, and are valid under the general
maritime law and laws of New York.
"
4St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Mattews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897) (A Missouri statute by which every
railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad in the state was made responsible in damages
for property of any person injured or destroyed by fire communicated by its locomotive engines
without regard to negligence was held constitutional).
-362 U.S. 440 (1960) (Criminal provisions of Smoke Abatement Code of Detroit are constitu-
tional and can be enforced to prevent air pollution even though ships docked at Port of Detroit
have been inspected and licensed by the federal government).
111d. at 444.
371d. at 445. The Court also said, Id. at 442:
The ordinance was enacted for the manifest purpose of promoting the health and welfare
of the city's inhabitants. Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that
people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of
what is compendiously known as the police power.
393 S.Ct. 1590 (1973) (hereinafter referred to as Askew.)
-'362 U.S. 440 (1960) (hereinafter referred to as Huron Cement.)
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provides that the guilty party or parties will be liable for the cleanup costs of
oil spills to the federal government," but recognizes four defenses4 to such
liability. The Federal Act also provides for a ceiling to the amount of cleanup
costs4" unless willful negligence is shown, in which case there may be unlimited
liability.13 The Florida Act provides for strict liability for the cost of cleaning
up oil spills to the state44 and at the same time provides for strict liability for
damages caused by injury to persons or property. 5 There are no defenses as
such to the unlimited liability the Florida Act imposes," and there is no ceiling
on the amount of cleanup costs assessed. 7 The Court held that because the
Federal Act was concerned with cleanup costs to the federal government only
and did not provide for such costs incurred by the states nor for damages
suffered by private individuals, there was no federal preemption nor any fatal
conflict between the statutory schemes.4
The Court squarely faced the question of uniformity in deciding the second
issue. The problem was not in determining whether oil pollution is a maritime
tort, for that question had been settled in the affirmative in earlier cases,4 9 but
*Water Quality Improvement Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (f) (1970).
"Id. § 1161 (f) (I). The four defenses are:
I. an act of God;
2. an act of war;
3. negligence on the part of the United States government;
4. acts or omissions of third parties, without regard to negligence.
121d. § 1161 (f)(l), (2), (3). Liability of an owner or operator of a vesel is limited to $100 per
gross tone of such vessel or $14,000,000, which ever is lesser. Liability of an owner or operator of
an onshore or offshore facility is limited to $8,000,000.
'
3 d. The willful negligence or willful misconduct must be within the privity and knowledge of
the owner.
"Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, FLA. GEN LAWS ch. 70-244, § 12
(1970).
151d.
"There is a provision for executive clemency whereby the defendant can petition the state under
defenses similar to those in the Federal Act, after the defendant has been held liable. It is then
within the state's discretion whether to waive reimbursement of the Florida Coastal Protection
Fund which the Florida Act created. Id. § 11(6).71d. § 12.
"'Askew, 93 S.Ct. at 1597 (1973).
"State Dept of Fish & Game v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (Where
vessel discharged oil while moored in navigable waters in California, the tort was maritime in
nature); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 339 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1964) (Insurers as
subrogees of incorporated yacht club and owners of boats brought action in admiralty under
negligence against the City of Los Angeles and others for damages, caused when oil from pipeline
spilled into harbor, for cleanup expenses, indemnity, and contribution); Salaky v. The Atlas Barge
No. 3, 208 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953) (Action for damages from oil sludge and foreign matter in the
water, allegedly discharged from defendant's barges, allowed in admiralty). Liability for oil pollu-
tion damage in admiralty depends on proof of either negligence (Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., supra) or unseaworthiness (The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1 (1903); See G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 129-133 (1957). If liability is established through neglg-
ence, the defendant owner may be able to avail himself of the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 181-189 (1970), if he can show that the loss was incurred without knowledge or privity on the
part of the shipowner (§ 183 (a)).
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rather in determining whether Jensen and its progeny constitutionally pre-
vented the waiver of preemption by Congress in the Federal Act,50 and, if not,
whether the states had been precluded from acting in this area of maritime torts
by the Admiralty Extension Act.5' The Admiralty Extension Act was quickly
disposed of:
While Congress has extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond the boundaries
contemplated by the Framers, it hardly follows from the constitutionality of
that extension that we must sanctify the federal courts with exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the exclusion of powers traditionally within the competence of the
States. One can read the history of the Admiralty Extension Act without
finding any clear indication that Congress intended that sea-to-shore injuries
be exclusively triable in the federal courts.52
As for the uniformity question raised by Jensen, the Court relied heavily on
Huron Cement in allowing state regulation even where Congress has acted. The
Court found no clear conflict with federal law.53 The Court refused to allow
the Jensen rule ". . . to engulf everything that Congress chose to call 'admi-
ralty,' preempting state action. ' '54 Jensen was limited to its facts 5 and the
Florida Act placed under the protection of the "gap theory. '5
ISupra, note 8.
"'Supra, note 7. Traditionally whether a tort was considered to be a maritime tort or not
depended on the locality where the tort occurred. In Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No.
13902) (C.C. Me. 1813), Justice Story said:
In regard to torts I have always understood, that the jurisdiction of the admiralty is
exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act. The admiralty has not and never (I
believe) deliberately claimed to have any jurisdiction over torts, except such as are
committed on the high seas, or on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.
See Victory Carriers Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971), in which the Court, after quoting
Justice Story, says that his viewpoint has been constantly reinterated. Contra, Executive Jet Avia-
tion, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972) (The Supreme Court held that the "locality"
test alone was insufficient and that a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity must
be shown).
Thus, injuries done to land or land structures were outside admiralty jurisdiction. Kenward v.
The Admiral Peoples,- 295 U.S. 649 (1934) (Admiralty jurisdiction in tort cases does not extend
to injuries caused by a vessel to persons or property on land. Where the cause of action arises upon
land, state law is applicable); Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191 (1911) (Bridge struck by a vessel was
essentially a land structure, maintained and used as an aid to commerce on land; its locality and
character were such that the tort was non-maritime. GILMER & BLACK, supra note 49, at 432. The
Admiralty Extension Act was passed to cover some of those injuries. Id., at 433. The Admiralty
Extension Act has been applied directly to oil pollution in In re New Jersey Barging Co., 168 F.
Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where the vessel's oil pollution of navigable waters, resulting in
damage to shoreline property, was held to be a maritime tort within admiralty jurisdiction.
5 Askew, 93 S.Ct. at 1600. The Court in a footnote then refers to H.R. REP. No. 1523, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), S. REP. No. 1593, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 1898 (1948).
"
3Askew, 93 S.Ct. at 1600.
511d., at 1601.
551d.
.561d.
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Although the Court has carved out a new area for state action in the mari-
time area, giving support to its decision in Huron Cement and reaffirming a
strong Congressional policy against pollution, its decision in Askew leaves
several questions unanswered, and for this reason it is difficult to predict what
the effect of the Court's opinion will be. The Court refused to decide whether
the limited liability provisions of section 12 of the Florida Act will stand in the
face of the Limitation of Liability Act,57 or even whether the Federal Act
removes the pre-existing liability limits of the Limitation of Liability Act.5 8 Nor
did the Court decide whether regulations issued pursuant to the Florida Act
setting certain standards would be invalid because the subject to be regulated
requires uniform federal regulation.5 9 Also, the Court declined to say whether
such regulations conflicted with Coast Guard regulations issued pursuant to the
Federal Act.60 The resolution of this constitutional controversy has apparently
been made before all the issues are ripe, for now each issue will have to be
litigated separately. If these issues are resolved in favor of the federal govern-
ment it would certainly emasculate the decision in the instant case, yet what
happens to the supremacy of federal law if these questions are decided in the
state's favor?'
The decision is none too clear about the limits of admiralty jurisdiction. The
district court apparently believed that the "gap theory" had been lain to rest
in the Supreme Court's decision in Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc.62 That
case dealt clearly with a maritime question and was incorrectly applied to a
question involving the fringes of admiralty jurisdiction.
It may be unfair to expect the Court to resolve a question long considered
impossible to answer, however, it can be said that the Court's decision in Askew
leaves other courts in no worse position than before when a question involving
the limits of admiralty jurisdiction and uniformity is brought before them. Yet,
despite the unanswered questions in the Askew decision, the end result will be
the strengthening of a state's power to protect its environment. Shipowners and
owners of terminal facilities will be put on notice that they may have to comply
with state laws which are stricter than the federal laws. If the Court follows its
reasoning in Askew, the unlimited liability provision of the Florida Act will
probably be upheld, as cleanup costs to the state and the possibility of economic
damage to individuals are separate expenses not covered by the Federal Act.
57Supra note 6. See note 49.
"Askew, 93 S.Ct. at 1595.
"1d., at 1597-98.
"ld., at 1598.
"An argument very similar to this was made by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Huron Cement.
See Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 453-55 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62398 U.S. 375 (1970) (Wrongful death action recognized under general maritime law). The
district court said, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1249 (1971):
The decision clearly reinforced the policy of uniformity and is an indication that admi-
ralty cannot tolerate the inconsistency inherent in accommodating state remedial stat-
utes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts.
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If this is done, hopefully it will lessen the frequency of oil pollution, as few
potential polluters could risk incurring unlimited liability and would protect
themselves with the safest equipment.
On the other hand it can be argued that uniform regulation of oil pollution
is the most effective means of combatting oil pollution.13 If regulation were
uniform, an industry could not impose economic sanctions detrimental to a
state simply because that state protected its natural resources more firmly than
another.64 However, federal legislation has not proven sufficiently effective. It
is neither stringent enough in its measures nor effective enough in its applica-
tion. The Torrey Canyon disaster, which caused a massive oil slick that dam-
aged the shorelines of England and France in 1967, illustrates the inequities
that may result if limitations are placed on liability.65 Water pollution by oil
can be devastating not only to those states who rely on tourism for their major
source of income by also to the ecology.6 Hopefully the Supreme Court's
decision in Askew will mean that the states will be free to enact stringent
pollution control laws concurrently with the federal government, without the
demand for "uniformity" striking them down.67
Mary E. Deal
6'3Comment, The Florida Oil Spill and Pollution Control Act, An Intrusion into the Federal
Maritime Domain, 12 J. NATURAL RESOURCES 615 (1972).
"Id., at 625-626.
65lf the Torrey Canyon had been subject to the Federal Act, liability would have been set at
$6,000,000 ($100 x 60,0000 gross tons), while actual cleanup costs were approximately S20,000,000.
Comment, The Control of Pollution By Oil Under The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
27 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 278, 297-98 (1970).
" Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J. 316, 321-23 (1969).
'
7The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18,
1972) does not change 33 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq.
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